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RELIGION, ETHICAL COMMUNITY AND THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST EVIL
Allen Wood

This paper deals with the motivation behind Kant's conception of "religion"
as "the recognition of all our duties as divine commands". It argues that in
order to understand this motivation, we must grasp Kant's conception of
radical evil as social in origin, and the response to it as equally social - the
creation of a voluntary, universal "ethical community". Kant's historical
model for this community is a religious community (especially the
Christian church), though Kant regards traditional churches or religious
communities as suitable to their moral vocation only if they undergo
Enlightenment reform. The paper concludes with a plea for the
Enlightenment view of religion, and an indictment of the common failure to
understand it correctly.

Religion and subjectivity. In Part Four of Religion Within the Boundaries of
Mere Reason, Kant states his more or less official definition of 'religion':
"Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as
divine commands" (Ak 6:153; cf. 6:443).1 To be religious, for Kant, is to
view all one's duties as commands issued to one by God. Kant's wording
of this definition, apparently restricting the definition to religion "subjectively considered", might suggest that there could be another, "objective"
way of considering religion, and this "objective religion" might have a different definition. But in fact Kant never offers a definition of that sort. In
fact, Kant had already put forward this same official definition in Part
Three in the following words: "Religion is the moral disposition
(Gesinnung) to observe all duties as [God's] commands" (Ak 6:105). There
is no suggestion here that this is a definition only of one kind of religion, to
which another kind might be opposed. Instead, there is only a further
emphasis on the subjectivity of all religion (as consisting in a special kind
of "moral disposition"). A reasonable (and I think correct) inference from
these facts is that Kant, like Kierkegaard, regards all religion as entirely a
matter of "subjectivity". It has to do with one's way of regarding one's
duties, and with one's moral disposition or attitude in fulfilling duties.
Religiousness, then, is solely a matter of a person's subjective attitude
toward the moral life. A moral agent is religious if she associates her moral
duties with the thought that they are commanded by God, and observes
her duties in that spirit. She might do this, for instance, by thinking about
the moral life in terms of her personal relationship with God. Thus she
might think of her moral transgressions as troubling that relationship, and
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 17 No.4 October 2000
All rights reserved

498

RELIGION, COMMUNITY, AND EVIL

499

her resolve to do better in the future as an attempt to repair that relationship, by giving God a reason to forgive her. This clearly is the way Kant
represents the moral life of the individual in Part Two of the Religion,
which dealt with "the battle of the good against the evil principle for
dominion over the human being" by invoking Kantian interpretations of
the traditional Christian doctrine of justification (Ak 6:66-84).
The idea that religion for Kant is an entirely "subjective" matter may,
however, also give rise to the thought that he regards it as an entirely
optional matter whether one regards one's duties as divine commands.
This is certainly true in the sense that Kant, as a strongly convinced political liberal about all religious matters, thinks that it would be a basic violation of right to compel anyone to regard them in this way, as when people
are forced to participate in religious services or make confession of a religious creed. It would be even more repugnant if they were forcibly made
to think about their moral duties as commands of God.
But the "subjectivity" of religion for Kant might also be taken to imply
Kant regards it as in general a matter of moral indifference whether one
thinks about one's moral life religiously or not: that there is nothing in
rational morality itself that might justify or even provide strong moral reasons for looking at one's moral life in a religious light. It might also be
interpreted to mean that for Kant religion is entirely an individual matterthat "religion" has to do solely with the way people, when they happen to
be so disposed, choose to think privately about their personal duties. On
this account, Kant's conception of religion would be both "liberal" and
"Protestant" in the extreme - it would consist solely a matter of the wholly
optional private thoughts and feelings individuals might have about their
duties. Nothing people might do outwardly or collectively could have anything distinctively "religious" about it, since for religion to have that sort of
existence would be to make it into something "objective", which would be
foreign or even inimical to the nature of religion as Kant conceives it. The
interpretation might be reinforced by noting that Kant found formal religious creeds morally objectionable and regarded religious services as
"counterfeit service of God"; he himself always refused on principle to participate in religious services of any kind, even when such participation was
(at least an informal) component of his duties as rector of the University of
Konigsberg. It might lead to the further thought that Kant's insistence on
the "subjectivity" of religion might really represent a desire on his part to
exclude religion altogether from human life, and certainly to exclude it
from the collective or shared life of human society.
It is my purpose in this paper to show that the interpretation of Kant's
conception of religion described in the last paragraph is mistaken. By this I
do not mean only that it is exaggerated or one-sided, but rather that it is
fundamentally wrong. It is a basic and not a marginal misinterpretation of
Kantian ethics to regard religion even as incidental to rational morality
(much less as morally superfluous or undesirable). It is the very reverse of
the truth to interpret Kant's emphasis on the "subjectivity" of religion and
his insistence that religious activities must always be voluntary, never
coerced, to mean that he regards religion as properly a private rather than
a public thing. Probably the deepest error of all is to think that because
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Kant disapproved of creeds and traditional religious rituals, he must have
regarded public or organized religion as of doubtful or negative value. For
this is to impose on an eighteenth century thinker our twentieth century
prejudices about what religion is, then letting these prejudices constrain
what we take that thinker's options consist in, and consequently forcing on
him a choice he would not have made. It is rather like saying of the ancient
Israelites (as some of their shortsighted contemporaries might have said)
that because they disapproved of the worship of idols, they must therefore
have been atheists.
Why should my duties be regarded as God's commands? The right
place to begin our inquiry, I think, is with the question: Why does Kant
think moral agents might choose subjectively to regard their duties as
divine commands? Obviously this cannot be because this way of regarding
them plays any role in determining the ground of obligation. For Kant is
emphatic that "theological morality" (or divine command theory) cannot
give us a satisfactory account of the categorical obligation attaching to
duty. Taken in one way, divine command theory is a theory of heteronomy, which must rest obligation on a contingent volition (e.g. of our love or
our fear of God), thus undermining the categorical character of obligation
(Ak 4:443, 5:40-41). On a more sympathetic interpretation of divine command theory, this theory regards God's commands as obligatory because it
is contained in our rational concept of God that God has a perfect will,
hence that he necessarily wills all and only that which is in itself right (i.e.
categorically obligatory). But of course this still does not explain why
God's perfect volitions should have to us the determinate character of commands. Even if we solved that problem, however, we would still need an
account of what categorical obligation consists in; only a theory of autonomy of the will, and not divine command theory, will suffice for a satisfactory account of obligation.
For this reason, thinking of our duties as divine commands cannot
playa role in the proper motivation for doing our duty. On the contrary, the
only pure motive for doing our duties is the motive of duty itself, or, as
Kant restates this motive in the Groundwork, the worth of rational nature in
the person of the finite rational being to whom we owe the duty (Ak 4:427429). God himself, as a being with a pure will, must will that we should
perform our duties from this motive rather than, say, from fear of his
power or hope of his favor; for either of these motives would compromise
the autonomy of our will, something a good God could not will that we do.
Just as little could the thought that our duties are divine commands
play any role in determining the content of duties. For he holds that we
have no special duties to God (Ak 6:443-444). Nor could our acquaintance
with duty come from any special divine revelation. We can have no empirical acquaintance with any being corresponding to our concept of God,
since this concept is an idea of reason to which no experience could ever be
adequate. Instead, things must work just the other way round; our only
possible acquaintance with what God wills or commands must come from
our rational awareness of the content of duty, and the thought that God, as
a supremely perfect being, must necessarily will that our duties be performed.
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Kant does not even think that we have to believe that there really is a
God who wills that we perform our duties. Even a religious person, who
regards her duties as divine commands, need not be certain that her duties
are in fact commanded by God. For religion, Kant says, "no assertoric
knowledge (even of God's existence) is required, [but] only a problematic
assumption (hypothesis) as regards speculation about the supreme cause
of things;" the "faith" that is strictly indispensable to religion "needs merely the idea of God .. .only the minimum cognition (it is possible that there is a
God) has to be objectively sufficient" (Ak 6:153-154). To be religious, then,
I do not even have to believe in the existence of God. Religion requires that
I have duties, that I have a concept of God (as a possible supreme cause of
things), and that my awareness of duty is subjectively enlivened by the
thought that if there is a God, then my duties are God's commands. We are
still trying to find out, however, why Kant thought that a moral agent even one who is agnostic about God's existence - might have a good reason subjectively to regard her duties as divine commands.
Kant's most explicit answer to our question consists in appealing to
our pursuit of the highest good (summum bonum), and our need to conceive
this pursuit in relation to the will of God. The highest good requires, namely, a correspondence of happiness to worthiness to be happy, and Kant
famously maintains that we can conceive of such a correspondence only by
supposing that the world is governed by a being that is omniscient (so as to
know our worthiness to be happy), omnipotent (so as to be able to grant
happiness in proportion to worthiness) and perfectly good (so that it wills,
both justly and benevolently, that beings who have made themselves worthy of happiness should partake in it). Accordingly, Kant answers our
question as follows: "[Our duties] must be regarded as commands of the
supreme being because we can hope for the highest good ... only from a
morally perfect. .. will, and therefore we can hope to attain only through
harmony with this will" (Ak 5:129).
This answer, however, is highly unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete,
and for at least three reasons. First, it seems to appeal to Kant's moral
arguments for believing in the existence of God (as the sole way of conceiving the possible reality of the highest good); it therefore fails to explain
why Kant might suppose that even someone who is agnostic about God's
existence might nevertheless regard her duties as divine commands.
Second, although we may hope to attain the highest good only if our will is
in harmony with God's will, it has not yet been explained why we should
think of this harmony specifically as our obedience to commands issued by
God's will. Third, even if we ignore these problems, however, the answer
is still incomplete in that it merely shifts our attention to another big question we may have about Kantian ethics: Why in any case do we have to
regard the highest good as a necessary object of our pursuit?
This is also the point at which to articulate another worry we may
have about Kant's entire account of religion, as we have seen it so far. This
account seems legalistic in a way that is probably unappealing to most of
us, and may even seem inconsistent with certain parts of Kant's own doctrines. As an object of religious attitudes, God seems to be conceived exclusively as a moral legislator, a powerful holy being who issues commands.
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As religious people, our subjective attitude toward God seems to be that of
the subject of a cosmic monarch, to whose will we are supposed to conform in order to attain the highest good (that is, to obtain the happiness of
which our conduct has made us worthy). It must be admitted, of course,
that this way of representing God, as a cosmic lawgiver, and of our love to
him, as obedience to his commands, is quite traditional - it is basic to much
theology in both the medieval and early modern periods. Yet Kant's theory
of moral obligation as grounded on autonomy seemed attractive precisely
because it distanced itself from this picture, repudiating the divine command moralist's conception of obligation as based on cringing obedience to
the orders of a cosmic despot and regarding moral agents instead as selfgoverning rational beings, who are bound to the moral law by their sense
of their own dignity as self-legislators.
My thesis will be that there is a solution to all these problems, consisting in the fundamental role played in Kant's conception of religion by the
idea of an ethical community.
Evil and sociability. But our route to this solution must take yet another apparent detour, through Kant's doctrine of the radical evil in human
nature. Kant holds that two sorts of incentives present themselves to the
human will: incentives of inclination, referring to our natural desires, and
incentives of reason, referring to our dignity as self-governing rational
agents; the latter incentives always have rational priority over the former,
especially when these rational incentives take the form of categorically
valid moral imperatives. Yet Kant also holds that we find in human beings
an innate propensity to invert the rational order of these incentives, preferring incentives of inclination over those of reason, choosing the satisfaction
of empirical desires over the rational commands of duty (Ak 6:36-39). The
human being, in his view, is an animal rationabilis, an animal capable of reason, but not an animal rationale, a being in which this capacity is typically
exercised successfully (Ak 7:321-322).
Kant calls this propensity the "radical" evil in human nature, because
it lies at the root of all the particular evil we do. It shows itself not only
directly in the form of "depravity" - the direct preference of natural desires
over rational principles - but also in the two lesser degrees of "fragility"
(the tendency not to abide by good maxims we have adopted) and "impurity" (the need for empirical incentives in order to do what reason commands) (Ak 6:29-30). It shows itself in the "bestial" vices of gluttony,
drunkenness and wildness (Ak 6:26-27) and in the crude vices of brutality
and cruelty toward other human beings (Ak 6:33), but also equally, or perhaps to an even greater extent, in the better concealed "civilized" vices,
engendered by jealousy and rivalry between human beings, such as envy,
deceitfulness, ingratitude, and malicious gloating over the misfortunes of
others (Ak 6:27, 33-34).
Since the incentives that we tend to prefer to moral ones come from
our natural inclinations, it might be thought that in the struggle between
good and evil, the enemy for Kant is natural desire as such. But this would
certainly not follow, since evil on Kant's account of it does not lie in either
the fact or the particular content of natural inclinations but rather in our
tendency to give them greater motivational weight than they rationally
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deserve. Kant sees things this way too, since he is quite explicit, moreover,
in maintaining that natural inclinations are in themselves good. He takes
the Stoics to task for viewing the moral struggle as a contest between reason and natural desire: "Those valiant men mistook their enemy, who is
not to be sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline
and openly display themselves unconcealed to everyone's consciousness,
but is rather as it were an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason
and is hence all the more dangerous" (Ak 6:57).
Kant distinguishes three "predispositions" in human nature: (1) "animality," the source of our natural desires relating to the survival of the
individual and the species, and to our sociability; (2) "humanity," the
ground of our capacity to set ends according to reason and to take the sum
of our inclinations as a comprehensive end under the name of "happiness";
and (3) "personality," the ability to give and obey laws through reason
alone, hence the ground of our moral accountability (Ak 6:26). All are in
themselves good, but two of them are also incapable of being the source of
evil. Personality cannot be, since for it the moral law alone is an incentive,
and animality, though it can have vices "grafted onto it", cannot be the
source of these vices because it has to do solely with instinctive desires, not
with comparison between incentives and the choice of one over another, in
which evil consists. The source of evil, therefore, must lie in our predisposition to humanity, which contains "a self-love which is physical and yet
involves comparison (for which reason is required)" (Ak 6:27). The reason
involved in our humanity is "comparative," however, not only in the way
it treats desires (uniting them into a comprehensive end of happiness, and
choosing to satisfy one rather than another) but also in the way it regards
the self of the rational being who makes such choices and pursues happiness: "that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself
happy or unhappy. Out of this self-love originates the inclination to gain
worth in the opinion of others" (Ak 6:27). Originally, and innocently, this is
merely a desire to be equal to others, but our anxiety that others may seek
an ascendancy over us turns it gradually into "an unjust desire to acquire
superiority for oneself over others. Upon this, namely, upon jmlousy and
rivalry, can be grafted the greatest vices of secret or open hostility to all
whom we consider alien to us" (Ak 6:27). Our desire to be happy, therefore
- to form the idea of a comprehensive good, encompassing all our inclinations - is a product of rational humanity, not of animal nature; and fundamentally its rationale is to assist us in comparing ourselves to others,
where the comparison is motivated by a competitive desire to be worth
more than they are, in their eyes and therefore in our own.
Kant thinks nature uses this natural antagonism between human
beings to prod us to develop the faculties of our species (Ak 6:27). This
Kant calls our "unsociable sociability" (Ak 8:20-22). It makes us sociable
creatures, insofar as we need the comparison with others, and their opinion of our self-worth, as a measure of our own well-being, but at the same
time it is an unsociable tendency, since it leads us to seek an unjust superiority over others who, as rational beings, are really our equals. From a
moral standpoint, therefore, unsociable sociability is identical to a propensity to evil. For the moral law tells us in effect that all human beings are of
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equal worth as ends in themselves (Ak 4:429), and that we must adopt only
those ends that can be brought into harmony with others in a "realm" of
ends (Ak 4:432). But owing to our natural propensity to seek superiority
over others, we tend to treat our own inclinations as having greater worth
than those of others; we have, in other words, a propensity to "self-conceit", that is to claim a pre-eminent worth for ourselves prior to our conformity to the moral law, and thus to treat our own inclinations as if they
were legislative in place of the moral law of reason (Ak 5:73-74).
Evil for Kant is therefore a product of human reason under the natural
conditions of its full development, which are found in the social condition.
The radical evil in human nature is an inevitable accompaniment of the
development of our rational faculties in society. Kant regards this fact as
crucial in determining the way we must struggle against evil:
"The human being is in this perilous state through his own fault;
hence he is bound at least to apply as much force as he can muster in
order to extricate himself from it. But how? That is the question. - If
he searches for the causes and circumstances that draw him into this
danger and keep him there, he can easily convince himself that they
do not come his way from his own raw nature, so far as he exists in
isolation, but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in
relation or association. It is not the instigation of nature that arouses
what should properly be called the passions, which wreak such great
devastation in his originally good predisposition. His needs are but
limited and his state of mind in providing for them moderate and
tranquil. He is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that
he is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and
despise him for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its
own is undemanding, as SOOIl as he is among human beings (Ak 6:93-94).
The need for ethical community. The source of evil, Kant concludes,
is social. The struggle against it, he concludes, if it is to be effective, must
therefore also be social. 2 Kant thinks that if we imagine the struggle against
evil individualistically, in the form of isolated individuals each struggling
heroically against his own inclinations and his own propensity to evil, then
we are only concocting a recipe for the ignominious defeat of morality.
Kant makes this anti-individualistic point about the struggle against evil
both repeatedly and emphatically; it is central to the argument of the last
two books of the Religion, and it is the note on which he chooses to end his
textbook on anthropology with which whose publication he ended his
career. Hence it could, literally and without exaggeration, also be called
Kant's last word about the human condition as a whole:
"If no means could be found to establish a union which has for its
end the prevention of this evil and the promotion of the good in the
human being, [then] however much the individual human being
might do to escape from the dominion of this evil, he would still be
held in incessant danger of relapsing into it" (Ak 6:94).
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"The highest good cannot be achieved merely by the exertion of the
single individual toward his own moral perfection, but instead
requires a union of such individuals into a whole working toward the
same end - a system of well-disposed human beings, in which and
through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass"
(Ak 6:97-98).
"In working against the [evil] propensity [in human nature] ... our
will is in general good, but the accomplishment of what we will is
made more difficult by the fact that the attainment of the end can be
expected not through the free agreement of individuals, but only
through the progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and
toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically combined"
(Ak 7:333).
We need, however, to understand a little more clearly why Kant thinks
an ethical community is needed in the struggle against the evil in human
nature. His reason is apparently that the origin of evil is social, and therefore the struggle against it must take the form of a certain kind of society.
But taken in one quite natural way, the form of that argument is not at all
convincing. For if we were to decide that all evil in human nature is due to
hatred or greed, it would not therefore be natural or reasonable to conclude that what we require to combat evil is some special form of hatred or
greed. Looking at the matter this way, if we decide that evil is social in its
origin, then the most natural inference from this might be that the struggle
against it should take the form of self-isolation (the solution of the hermit).
The hermit's attitude, however, is one that Kant utterly rejects, calling it
"negative misanthropy" a "flight from humanity" (Ak 27:672). Even if such
a person wishes others well, his "timidity" or "anthropophobia"
(Leutescheucn, Anthropophobie) is contrary to the duties of love which we
have toward other human beings (Ak 6:450).
The point of Kant's argument that the struggle against evil requires a
moral community can be seen more clearly if we think about his account of
evil in greater detail; and this will also give us a clearer indication of the
nature of the community that is needed. Our unsociable sociability is evil
because, seeking superiority to others through competing with them for
such goods as money, honor and power, we set ends that are not only contrary to the ends others actually set, but are also in conflict with the very
possibility of a system of ends that might unite all rational beings on the
basis of mutual respect for their equal dignity as ends in themselves.
Directly to combat this tendency consists in adopting ends that do in fact
agree (or even coincide) with the ends of other human beings, and that do
so by directly fulfilling the idea of a "realm" in which all ends form an
organic unity or mutually supporting system. Such a system would constitute a "community" CGemeinschaft) of ends in the technical metaphysical
sense of that term (as it is used, for example, in the Table of Categories,
KrV A80/B106). That is, between the ends of rational beings there would
be a reciprocity, so that the pursuit of each end would advance the pursuit
of others, and human ends would constitute a self-organizing whole, com-
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bined into a unity like the parts of a living organism. That is what Kant
means, at the end of the Anthropology, when he speaks of "the progressive
organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system
that is cosmopolitically combined" (Ak 7:333). The kind of society we need
in order to struggle against evil is one that "progressively organizes" all
human beings so that they gradually become a cosmopolitan community
of this kind. In the Religion, Kant's name for this sort of society is "ethical
community" (etlzisclzes gemeines Wesen) (Ak 6:94).
Several things follow directly from the fundamental nature of ethical
community. First, such a community cannot be conceived on the model of a
juridical commonwealth or political state, whose function is to protect the
right of human beings through coercion. A juridical community or political
state determines which actions we may rightfully perform, and it protects
the right by guaranteeing their performance through the use of external
force. The state's rightful power extends only to compelling me by force to
restrict my actions so that they are consistent with everyone else's freedom
according to universal law (Ak 6:230). A juridical community cannot determine the ends set by human beings, because setting ends is an act of freedom; and for it to attempt to do so would even be contrary to the right it is
supposed to protect. The closest the state could come to making me adopt an
end would be to compel me to perform actions that serve the ends adopted
by someone else (i.e. the state's despotic ruler); and to do that would be contrary to the right of the state, since it would violate my right as a free and
rational being. It follows that membership and participation in an ethical
community must always be entirely voluntary, never subject to external
compulsion of any kind (Ak 6:94-95).
Second, since the aim of ethical community is the combination of all
human beings into a single system or realm of ends, the ethical community
cannot be subject to any sort of limitation as to its extent, as by restricting it to
people who live in a certain geographical area or belong to a specific race or
heredity. For the same reason, it may not bind itself to any specific practices
or creeds that would exclude part of the human race from belonging to it.
This means, thirdly, that it can recognize only ends and motivations
that are ethical (deriving from laws of reason, which are in their concept
freely yet universally binding). And that entails, fourthly, that the constitution of this community (the principles of its union) must be unchangeable,
which requires at the same time that the rules of its administration must
remain completely flexible and open to constant modification in order to
reflect the free, rational judgment of its members and in order to enable it
to pursue the end of progressively including more and more of the human
race, since its members of necessity include in principle all rational beings
without exception.
Kant organizes these four features of the ethical community in accordance with the four headings of his table of categories (KrV A80/BI06):
Quantity (of the community itself): Unity, guaranteed by the universality of its extent
Quality (of the incentives motivating membership in it): Purity,
depending solely on moral incentives of reason
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Relation (between its members): Freedom, admitting no coercive government either by a juridical state or by a class of officials within the
ethical community itself
Modality: Unchangeableness (of its constitution), but freedom and
openness of its mode of administration (Ak 6:101-102).
Ethical community and religion. We are now in a position to use
Kant's conception of ethical community to solve the problems about his
concept of religion that earlier perplexed us.
We wondered, to begin with, why Kant thinks that we should regard
our duties as divine commands. The answer to this lies in a thesis he holds
about the ethical community, namely, that it is best conceived as "a people
of God" under pure moral laws of virtue (Ak 6:99). Kant distinguishes the
legislator of a law, the one who issues a command and may attach positive
or negative sanctions to it, from the law's author, the one whose will imposes the obligation to obey it. In these terms, Kant thinks only the idea of the
rational will of every rational being as such can be conceived as its author
(Ak 4: 431,448); but that if the moral law is to be regarded as a public law,
binding on an actual community of human beings, then God's will is the
only one fittingly regarded as its legislator (Ak 6:227; 6:99). For (as required
by the "quality" criterion of the ethical community) only this will is pure or
holy, and universal in its extent. In the case of a juridical community, it is
permissible and even necessary to think of the combined will of the citizens as the legislator; but a fallible and contingently restricted will of this
kind would be inappropriate for a moral community. We should regard
our duties as divine commands, therefore, because (and to the extent that)
we ought to view ourselves as members of an ethical community, whose
legislator is God.
The ethical community must be open even to agnostics, because Kant
holds that no satisfactory theoretical proofs either of the existence or the
nonexistence of a Deity can ever be given, and if membership in the moral
community is to be truly universal, it has to extend at least to all those
whose beliefs fall within the range of belief consistent with the state of the
possible theoretical evidence. Moreover, even an agnostic is capable of
forming the concept of God, and of recognizing the will of such a being as
an appropriate legislator for the moral law when it is regarded as the law
of a living human community. Thinking of the moral law as commanded
by a (possible or actual) God whose free, moral sovereignty unites people
in a universal human society is the best way for me to think of moral laws
as having public recognition, and myself as belonging with others to an
ethical community which is united by that recognition.
We were also puzzled by the fact that Kant links our conception of
duties as divine commands to our pursuit of the highest good (summum
bonum), as the sum-total of all moral ends. We wondered why Kant thinks
we need to regard ourselves as pursuing such an all-encompassing, universal end, at all, and also what role this pursuit was supposed to play in
religion (the subjective recognition of all duties as divine commands). Now
we see that what is fundamental to the ethical community is the fact that
human beings should pursue in common a set of ends that are systemati-
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cally united into a "cosmopolitical combination" or "realm", that is, an
organic unity. When we try to think of this organic unity of all rational
ends as a single end, what we are thinking of is just the highest good (summum bonum). Kant thinks we are bound to be assailed by doubts concerning the real possibility of ever achieving this end, but that we have an
answer to such doubts in the form of a faith in God as a supreme legislator
and governor of the world, through whose highest knowledge, absolute
power and perfect will the highest good is possible. Kant's conception of
the highest good as perfect morality or virtue combined with happiness
proportionate to it is, admittedly, very abstract. But this is because it is
merely the general idea of the unity of all ends on which all rational beings
can agree. Even agnostics can join in pursuit of it, and hopes for its achievement even provide them with subjective or moral grounds for believing in
God (though such moral arguments constitute no theoretical evidence in
favor of such belief).
Our worry that Kant's conception of religion is uncomfortably legalistic can also be addressed. Kant conceives religion this way because, following much theological tradition, he thinks of God as a moral legislator, and
of the ethical community as like a political community in being bound
together by public recognition of a common legislation. But he is very
clear that the ethical community differs decisively from any political community in that membership in it must be wholly free and voluntary, and
the only incentives to obey its laws must be purely moral, not externally
coercive. For this reason, there is no room in the moral community as Kant
conceives it for a religious hierarchy of any kind, or even any form of government (whether monarchical, aristocratic or democratic) (Ak 6:991-100).
"It could best of all be likened to the constitution of a household (a
family) under a common though invisible moral father, whose holy
son, who knows the father's will and yet stands in blood relation
with all the members of the family, takes his father's place by making
the other members better acquainted with his will; these therefore
honor the father in him and thus enter into a free, universal and
enduring union of hearts" (Ak 6:102).

Though Kant does not make this explicit, it is arguable that an even
better analogy for the ethical community in Kantian ethical theory than the
family would be friendship. For in friendship, people achieve trust and intimacy with one another through sharing their ends, and friends (according
to Kant) even abandon the private end of their own happiness for the sake
of a common or shared end in which the happiness of the friends is swallowed up (Ak 6: 469-473, 27:423). Friendship and religion also have this in
common: friendship and the ethical community are the only non-juridical
social relationships into which Kant says we have an ethical duty to enter. 3
The ethical community and the church. Kant's conception of the ethical community is obviously modeled on organized religion, and especially
on the Christian church. More than this, Kant believes that (owing to a certain weakness of human nature) it is impossible for people directly to form
a pure ethical community, but they must rather reach such a community
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through "ecclesiastical faiths" which are originally very different in spirit
and conduct from pure religious faith, and approximate to a genuine ethical community only through a long process of historical progress, enlightenment and reform.
Ecclesiastical faiths are typically based on a scriptural authority,
guarded and interpreted by special scholars and a priestly hierarchy (Ak
6:100-103). Their "priestcraft" (Pfaffcntum) rules over people's minds by a
variety of ignominious means - superstitious fears, enthusiastic pretensions to mystical insight or empirical divine revelation, fetishistic attempts
to invoke divine favor or aid through petitionary prayers or other forms of
pretended magic and sorcery, and the "counterfeit service" (Afterdicl1st) of
God through all sorts of morally indifferent rites and statutory observances
(A 6:151-202). Kant looks forward to a time when the kernel of true religion
will outgrow this empirical shell, lay aside its superstitious and fetishistic
trappings, abolish "the humiliating distinction between laity and clergy",
and approach the condition of a genuine ethical community, which (in
Kant's view) it is the appointed historical task for organized religion someday to become (Ak 6:115-137).
Since Kant's fundamental conception of the human condition is that
we are a species of rational beings destined to struggle in history against
our innate propensity to evil, and since for Kant the ethical community is
conceived as the indispensable focal point for this struggle, it is virtually
impossible to overestimate the importance of organized religion in Kant's
scheme of things. We also miss one of the main conceptions of Kantian
ethics if we fail to appreciate how vital ethical community is to its conception of the moral life. Kantian ethics is fundamentally misconceived when
it portrayed only as a morality of cold duty and dessicated individuals
struggling stoically against their natural desires. We take a step in the right
direction when, with John Rawls, we see it "not as a morality of austere
command but an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem.'" But we still
miss the heart of it if we do not appreciate that the fundamental ideal of
Kantian ethics is that of a universal community of free beings in which all
are recognized and treated as equals and all work together toward human
dignity and happiness as a single shared or collective end.
The Enlightenment view of religion - and what it means that we fail
to understand it. Kant therefore is the first to admit (or even to proclaim)
that the ethical community which grounds his conception of religion is
very different from organized religion as it has ever existed. But here it
will be instructive to compare Kant's conception of organized religion and
its role in human history with his conception of the political state and its
historical role. Kant's model in the real world for the community whose
task it is to protect the right of persons is the juridical community or political state. He recognizes that no existing state comes very close to fulfilling
the rational idea of a juridical community, and in fact that most states are
themselves among the chief perpetrators of injustice and violators of
human rights. But he hopes that as people become more enlightened, existing states will shed the defects that now make them unjust, and over time
that they will gradually come to approximate that idea. For Kant, the only
political constitution that is really consistent with the idea of right is a
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republican one (Ak 8:349-350 and note). Most states in his time, including
the one in which he lived, were fundamentally different from this. But he
thinks that even a state whose constitution is not republican can come to
govern in the spirit of a republic, and over time it may even evolve into a
republican form of government. Kant looks forward to the time when there
will be a wide consensus among the members of the human race that no
state can be legitimate unless it fully protects the rights of its citizens, and
that the only truly satisfactory political constitution is a republican one.
Looking back over the last two hundred years, I think we must admit that
Kant's political hopes were not unreasonable; indeed, I think we have to be
impressed with them as not only remarkably prescient, but even as hopes
that decent people everywhere have come to share.
Analogously, Kant's model in the real world for the ethical community
is the church, or organized religion. Organized religion is to our historical
hopes for the moral improvement of the human race what the political
state is to our hope to live with other human beings on terms of safety,
peace, freedom and justice. Yet perhaps it is hard for us to take the analogy seriously, because political institutions and our demands on them have
evolved in the direction Kant had hoped they would, whereas religious
institutions have not. On the contrary, nineteenth and twentieth century
religion has often seen itself as engaged in a battle to preserve reverence for
tradition, ethnic diversity and a sense of the transcendent and mysterious
in human life against enlightenment rationalism, universalist and humanist morality, and a liberal, cosmopolitan society, that it blames for the rootlessness, disorder and moral degeneracy of modern life.
But we must not forget that the Enlightenment, especially in Germany,
was much more a religious than a political movement, and a movement that
it regarded as coming from within religion, not as a secularism arrayed
against it. Until we are able to recapture the perspective on history and religion represented by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, we will be unable
to understand what the Enlightenment was; we will be unable to grasp what
its true aims were, and we will be unable to estimate, or even properly to see
at all, the extent of its successes and failures - or, as I would prefer to put it,
we will be unable to see how far humanity in the last two centuries has been
impoverished by its failure to realize the ideals of the Enlightenment.
There are many in our century who have celebrated the failure of the
Enlightenment view of religion, regarding it as shallow and unspiritual,
and complacent in the thought that religious thinking and practice has left
it behind forever. In the past twenty years, there have also been many who
celebrate the failure of socialism in a similar spirit. Sometimes these
rejoicers are even the same people, as well they should be, since the historical hopes whose defeat they are welcoming have a great deal in common.
As someone who still cherishes those hopes, I confess I am torn between
pitying and being furious with those who are quick to bury them, but I am
uncertain whether either attitude is healthy. I am entirely certain, however,
that the future of the human race will be bleak indeed as long as it is left in
the hands of people who think as they do.
Stanford University
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NOTES
1. Kant's writings will be cited according to volume:page number in Kants
Schriften, Ausgabe der konigliche preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-), abbreviated as 'Ak'. Volume:page numbers
from the Academy Edition are now customarily given in English translations,
in particular those found in the Cambridge Edition of the Writings of
Immanuel Kant. The one exception to this, both in this paper and in the
Cambridge Edition, is the Critique of Pure Reason, which will be cited by AlB
page numbers (and abbreviated as 'KrY').
2. This "social" interpretation of Kant's doctrine of radical evil and the
response to it can also be found in Sharon Anderson-Gold, "God and
Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the Highest Good,"
in P. Rossi and M. Wreen (eds.) Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), pp. 113-131.
3. See Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), Chapter 9, § 4.3.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971), p. 256.

